Volume 65

Issue 2

Article 11

February 1963

Evidence--Witnesses--Impeachment of Court Witness By Prior
Statements
Thomas Richard Ralston
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas R. Ralston, Evidence--Witnesses--Impeachment of Court Witness By Prior Statements, 65 W. Va.
L. Rev. (1963).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol65/iss2/11

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Ralston: Evidence--Witnesses--Impeachment of Court Witness By Prior Statem
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 65

Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235 (1961). It is
recognized that a major problem arises as to which "agent" qualifies
as being able to apply the doctrine.
Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 953 (1956), provides an excellent depth study
of the problems involved in the attorney-corporation client privilege.
Including corporations within the privilege is favored.
UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 26(1), would terminate the
lawyer-client privilege available to a corporation upon dissolution,
and RULE 26(3) (a) defines a client as a "corporation or other
association that directly or through an authorized representative, con-

suits a lawyer ...

for the purpose of . . . securing legal relief."

Judicial review may soon be forthcoming on this question. Prior
to the Radiant Burners case, it was generally assumed corporations
could avail themselves of the attorney-client privilege. Attention
has now been sharply focused on the issue. Action by the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court of the United States will be
awaited.
Thomas Edward McHugh

Evidence-Witnesses--Impeachment of Court Witness By Prior
Statements
At D's trial for murder, the state sought to impeach a court
witness, called by the court at the state's request, by showing that
the witness had previously made a statement which he would not
acknowledge at the trial. The trial judge's ruling admitted only
the first sentence of the statement pertaining to the time and place
thereof. The state's attorney, over the objection of D's attorney,
and despite the judge's ruling, proceeded to introduce the contents
of the statement by inquiring of the witness whether he had made
specific statements. The judge, to remove any prejudicial error,
instructed the jury that the questions and answers were not to be
considered as evidence and that they related only to the credibility
of the witness. From an adverse judgment, D appealed. Held, reversed and case remanded for a new trial. The introduction of the
contents of the statement was prejudicial error. Rankin v. State,
143 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1962).
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The principal case raises some interesting issues involving impeachment of a witness. The witness was called by the court because the state's attorney frankly admitted that it was feared he
would be hostile and could not be vouched for. He had been an
eyewitness to the crime, and it is clear his testimony would have
been most valuable to the prosecution. The witness, however, declined to give any affirmative testimony and answered each question
with the phrase "I don't remember." The issue considered here
is whether it is permissible to impeach a witness, who professes to
ignorance and gives no testimony of value to either party, by disclosing to the jury the contents of a prior statement made by the
witness. Such disclosure is especially significant because of its
harmful effect on the defendant, who is being tried for a capital
offense.
As a general rule of law, any person offered as a witness is
subject to impeachment. In criminal cases both the witnesses for
the state and those for the defendant may be impeached in a
proper manner. 58 AM. Ju. WITNESSES § 680 (1948).
The testimonial qualifications of the adversary's witness are
always open to attack. After the proper foundation has been laid,
it is permissible to attack the credibility of a witness by showing
that at other times and places he has made statements which are
inconsistent with, or contradictory to, the testimony which he has
given. Lee Dong Sep v. Dulles, 220 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1955).
If prior statements of the witness are to be admitted for impeachment purposes, there must be real inconsistency between the two
assertions of the witness. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S.
391 (1957); State v. Price, 92 W. Va. 542, 115 S.E. 393 (1922).
The matter involved in the supposed contradiction must not be
merely collateral in its character, but must be relevant to the issue
being tried. State v. Carduff, 142 W. Va. 18, 93 S.E.2d 502 (1956).
Where the witness clearly denies having made the statement in
question, impeachment is in order. Weaver v. United States, 216
F.2d 23 (9th Cir. 1954). If the witness states that he does not
remember or does not recall, impeachment is still generally allowed.
Spence v. Browning Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 138 W. Va. 748,
77 S.E.2d 806 (1953).
It is generally recognized that impeachment may be resorted
to where a witness, by his testimony, has surprised the party offering him. Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1938);
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Everett v. State, 231 Ark. 880, 333 S.W.2d 233 (1960); State v.
Blankenship, 137 W. Va. 1, 69 S.E.2d 398 (1952). In a significant
number of jurisdictions it is also required that the testimony of the
witness must be damaging before impeachment will be permitted.
People v. Newson, 37 Cal. 2d 34, 230 P.2d 618 (Cal. 1951);
Hernandez v. State, 156 Fla. 356, 22 So. 2d 781 (1945). The
witness must testify positively to the existence of a fact prejudicial
to the party. If the witness merely fails to testify to facts expected
to be elicited, the party offering the witness on this point cannot,
under the guise or impeachment, supply the evidence from a third
party, or get before the jury statements that are otherwise inadmissible. Bryon v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 175, 234 S.W. 83 (1921).
For impeachment purposes, a court witness would appear to
be in much the same position as the witness of an adversary. A
court witness, however, is not a witness for either party. Where
such a witness in a criminal case gives testimony that is detrimental
to the state's case, it is not error for the court to permit the state's
attorney to lay a predicate to impeach, and later to permit him to
introduce testimony tending to impeach such witness. Brown v.
State, 91 Fla. 682, 108 So. 842 (1926). It has been held that a
court witness who testifies to a mere negative and testifies to no
substantive fact may not be impeached. Peoples v. State, 257 Ala.
295, 58 So. 2d 599 (1952). In People v. Johnson, 333 Ill. 469,
165 N.E. 235 (1929), a witness, who denied all knowledge of the
commission of the crime, was called by the court at the request
of the prosecution. When the witness denied making a prior contradictory statement, the prosecution was permitted to impeach.
Under the guise of impeachment, the prosecution was thus able
to get a prejudicial unsworn statement before the jury. This was
held to be reversible error.
Whatever the appropriate conditions for impeachment might be,
it is well settled that impeaching proof is not substantive evidence,
but is received only to affect the credibility of the witness. The
impeaching evidence is admissible only for the purpose of detracting
from the weight to be given to the witness' testimony, and to eliminate from the jury's minds any positive adverse effect therefrom,
and is not to be considered as evidence of the facts brought out
by the impeaching testimony, or for the purpose of supplying what
the hostile witness was expected to, but did not say, as a basis for
a verdict. Young v. United States, supra. With that in mind, the
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grounds for impeachment of a witness who testifies to a mere negative are questionable unless it can be said that a negative reply
is so adverse to a party's interest as to qualify as damaging testimony. Even if impeachment of the witness were proper, the introduction of the full contents of his prior statement would hardly
seem to be necessary or permissible. Perhaps, however, the view
expressed in Morton v. Hood, 105 Utah 484, 143 P.2d 434 (1943),
has some merit. There it was said that a witness cannot be permitted to prevent disclosure of material facts nor to evade impeachment by refusing to answer, or merely saying that he does not
remember, since the purpose of a trial is to disclose the truth and
receive competent proof of material and relevant facts.
Case precedents would indicate that West Virginia law is in
accord with the majority views on the subject of impeachment
and may serve as a summary of the law in general. A trial court
is sometimes warranted and may, at times, have a duty to call a
witness in a criminal case, but the right should be exercised cautiously. State v. Loveless, 142 W. Va. 809, 98 S.E.2d 773 (1957).
A witness may be impeached, after a proper foundation is laid by
calling attention to prior inconsistent statements, by proving such
statements, and whether the witness denies or fails to recollect them,
is not material. State v. Worley, 82 W. Va. 350, 96 S.E. 56 (1918).
There must be contradiction. If there is no substantial variance
between such statements and the testimony, the statements cannot
be introduced for purposes of impeachment. State v. Price, supra.
Contradictory statements of a witness as to material facts are admissible to weaken or destroy the value of his testimony, though
they probably are inadmissible as primary evidence of the controverted fact. Wilson v. McCoy, 86 W. Va. 103, 103 S.E. 42 (1920).
Thus, in West Virginia, it would seem that if a witness offers
testimony which is materially inconsistent with his prior statements,
he may be impeached to an extent permitted by the court in the
proper exercise of its discretion. If the witness fails to give any
positive testimony whatsoever, there appears to be little basis for
attacking his credibility, which is the legitimate purpose of impeachment, by the introduction of prior statements.
Thomas Richard Ralston
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